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A structured leasing is a new and highly flexible transaction that develops synergies between 
funding policy, risk management of the underlying assets, and tax benefits. It is used in 
particular transactions involving complex and large-scale assets, such as airplanes, ships, 
industrial plant and equipment, and large real estate projects.  
As in other tax-based techniques, the implementation of a structured leasing transaction, either a 
leveraged lease or a synthetic lease, is more significant when the value of the asset is large and 
allows for a potentially greater tax benefits’ appropriation. 
Structured leasing creates value by increasing liquidity and funding, reducing the funding costs, 
allowing sponsors to attain greater leverage and to increase tax shields, improving lessees’ risk 
management, and allowing lessees to maintain financial flexibility, by improving or maintaining 
financial ratios. 
Although all of the above-mentioned economic advantages, structured leasing also has 
problems. The most commonly referred problems of structured leases are complexity, off-
balance sheet treatment, higher transaction costs, and wealth expropriation. 
Besides describing the economic motivations and problems of structured leasing, this paper 
provides details on the characteristics of structured leasing activity and reviews the most 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on structured leasing is scarce when compared to other fields of corporate 
finance. In fact, neither in academic nor in professional literature can systematic studies be 
found dealing with the positioning of both researchers and economic agents in the market 
(financial intermediaries). Similarly, there is little discussion of structured leasing in leading 
corporate finance textbooks. Given the growing importance of structured leasing as a new 
financing instrument, corporate executives, bankers, lawyers, investors, government officials, 
and academics need to understand what structured leasing is, why and how it may create value, 
and how to structure transactions with both operational and financial success. 
Used in particular transactions involving complex and large-scale assets, such as 
airplanes, ships, industrial plant and equipment, and large real estate projects, a structured 
leasing transaction can fall within one of the following two categories: (i) leveraged transactions 
(mainly cross-border leasing with a trust); and (ii) synthetic leasing. A structured leasing is 
understood as a transaction that develops synergies between funding policy, risk management of 
the underlying assets and tax benefits. With these types of transactions, the sponsor aims to 
manage the need for funding in a creative manner, as opposed to just raising funds by means of 
recourse to the leasing instrument. Thus, structured leasing is a highly flexible tool. This idea is 
corroborated by Caselli (2005), who points out that a structured leasing, “… inasmuch as a 
leasing transaction can: (i) enable contract terms to be modulated in relation to the lessee’s 
cash flow structure; (ii) generate governable tax benefits, with a different sequence and 
structure than is achieved by depreciating the asset and covering attendant financial costs 
arising from the funding policy adopted to purchase the asset; (iii) finance the possible call 
option at the end of the leasing transaction.”
1
 
In the following sections, we discuss structured leasing literature based on the central 
economic benefits as well as on the major problems related to the use of these financing 
instruments. Our goal is to review the most influential papers, summarize their results, present 
their relationship to each other, and associate them with the existing empirical evidence. 
Furthermore, the main objective of this paper is to analyze the basic characteristics of structured 
leasing activity and to answer the following questions: (i) What is a leasing transaction?; (ii) 
What are the basic characteristics of a structured leasing transaction?; and (iii) What are the 
economic motivations and problems of structured leases? 
 
 
                                                 
1
 See Carretta and De Laurentis (1998) for a review of leasing transactions. For a comprehensive account 
of theoretical and empirical literature on structured leasing see, among others, Braund (1989), Slovin, 
Sushka and Polonchek (1990), Fowkes (2000), Caselli (2005), Fabozzi, Davis and Choudhry (2006), and 
Deo (2009). 
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2. What Is a Leasing Transaction? 
Fabozzi, Davis and Choudhry (2006) define leasing as “… a contract over the term of 
which the owner of the equipments permits another entity to use it in exchange for a promise by 
the latter to make a series of payments. The owner of the equipment is referred to as the lessor. 
The entity that is being granted permission to use the equipment is referred to as the lessee.” 
Based on the idea that earnings are originated from the use of an asset, not its ownership, 
leasing is commonly considered as an alternative method of financing. Leasing can and has 
been used to finance all types of assets including, but not limited to, industrial facilities (e.g., 
manufacturing and power generation), real estate (e.g., office, warehouse, and retail locations), 
and equipment (e.g., manufacturing and transportation). Thus, nearly asset that can be 
purchased can also be leased, from aircraft, ships, satellites, computers, refineries, and steam-
generating plants, on one hand, to typewriters, duplicating equipment, automobiles, and dairy 
cattle, on the other hand [Fabozzi et al. (2006) and Fowkes (2000)]. 
It is possible to identify the following steps in the design of a leasing transaction: (i) the 
lessee identifies the equipment needed, the model and the manufacturer; (ii) the lessee defines 
the features desired in terms of warranties, installation, services, etc.; (iii) the lessee defines the 
price; (iv) the lessee enters into a lease agreement with the lessor, in which they define the 
length of the lease, the rental, if installation charges should be included in the lease, and other 
optional characteristics; (v) the lessee assigns its purchase rights to the lessor, who buys the 
equipment as specified by the lessee; (vi) the lessor pays the price for the equipment and the 
lease enters into effect; (vii) at the end of the contract, the lessee usually has the option to renew 
the lease, to buy the equipment, or to terminate the agreement and return the equipment. The 
option selected by the lessee defines (i) the lease nature for tax purposes, and (ii) the lease 
classification for financial accounting purposes. 
Equipment leases can be classified as (A) Nontax-Oriented Leases or Tax-Oriented 




If a lease transaction is classified as a conditional sale lease or nontax-oriented lease: 
(i) all of the benefits and risks are substantially transferred to the lessee; (ii) the purchase or 
renewal option is not based on fair market value of the equipment at the time of exercise – is 
always lower; (iii) the lessee depreciates the property (treated as owned) for tax purposes; (iv) 
the lessee deducts the interest portion of the lease payments as an expense; and (v) the lessor 
treats the transaction as a loan. Conversely, if a lease transaction is classified as a tax-oriented 
true lease: (i) the lessor claims and retains tax benefits resulting from equipment ownership – 
depreciation cost deduction; (ii) the lessor transfers to the lessee a portion of those benefits in 
                                                 
2
 For a further discussion of lease typologies see, among others, Caselli (2005) and Fabozzi et al. (2006). 
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the form of reduced lease payments – via interest rate (or credit spread) reduction; (iii) the 
lessee deducts the full lease payment as a cost; (iv) the lessor owns the leased equipment at the 
end of the lease term – the lease contract has no purchase option or a purchase option based on 
the market value. Thus, in a nontax-oriented lease the lessor cannot offer the low lease rates 
associated with a true lease because the lessor does not retain the tax benefits available to the 
owner of the equipment.
3
 This idea is corroborated by Fabozzi et al. (2006), who argue that 
“[T]he principal advantage to a lessee of using a true lease to finance an equipment acquisition 
is the economic benefit that comes from the indirect realization of tax benefits that might 
otherwise be lost because the lessee cannot use the tax benefits. This occurs when the lessee 
neither has a sufficient tax liability, nor expects to be able to fully use the tax benefits in the 
future if those benefits are carried forward.” One of the mostly common motivations for using 
structured leasing is the possibility of the lessee to obtain a lower funding cost vis-a-vis 
borrowing directly from a financial institution. This reduction comes from the fact that when the 
lessee is unable to generate a sufficient tax liability to currently use all tax benefits, the cost of 
owning the equipment is higher than leasing it. 
Single-investor leases and leveraged leases are two categories of true leases. The first 
category is a two-party transaction in which the lessor purchases the leased equipment with its 
own funds. A leveraged leasing is similar to a single-investor lease – in terms of equipment 
selection and negotiation (rentals, options, responsibility for taxes, insurance, and maintenance) 
– but with a lower cost of funding, when compared to other methods of finance, and appreciably 
more complex in size, documentation, legal involvement, and, most importantly, the number of 
parties involved and the unique advantages that each party gains. Usually offered by 
corporations and financial institutions (tax benefits available to individual lessors are more 
limited), in a leveraged lease the lessor – which provides only 20% to 30% of the capital needed 
to purchase the equipment and the remainder is borrowed from institutional investor on a 
nonrecourse basis to the lessor – claims all of the tax benefits related to the ownership of the 
equipment and offers the lessee much lower lease rates when compared to single-investor leases 
[see, e.g., Fabozzi et al. (2006)]. 
Full payout leases, in contrast to operating leases, are basically financing transactions. 
An operating lease transaction is a true sale lease for tax purposes and thus the lessee can 
deduct the lease payments and the lessor is entitled to all tax benefits related to the equipments’ 
ownership. For financial accounting purposes, an operating lease is not disclosed in the lessee 
balance sheet as financial obligations – the lease equipment is not capitalized and the lease 
                                                 
3
 For example, in the U.S., the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) establishes requirements for a lease to be 
treated as a true sale. The distinction between tax-oriented and nontax-oriented true leases is the type of 
purchase option – conditional sale leases have nominal fixed-price options while true leases have market-
value purchase options. 
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obligation is not shown as a liability on the balance sheet.
4
 However, the lessee must disclose 
information about the lease transaction on footnotes to its financial statements. An operating 
leasing transaction in theory has a greater ‘tax acceleration’ than financial leasing. 
While there is an extensive literature on leasing, most of it focuses on the differential 
tax position of the lessee and the lessor as the primary rationale for leasing [e.g., Bower (1973), 
Miller and Upton (1976), Brealey and Young (1980), Smith and Wakeman (1985), and Brick, 
Fung, and Subrahmanyam (1987)].
5
 Miller and Upton (1976) conclude that no financial 
advantages accrue from leasing. Contrary, Lewellen, Long, and McConnell (1976) and Myers, 
Dill, and Bautista (1976) argue that, under a set of assumptions, there is a potential for gains in 
valuation for the firm involved in leasing because government can suffer a loss in taxes. 
Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998) show a negative relationship between operating leases 
and tax rates, and a positive relationship between debt levels and tax rates. Eisfeldt and Rampini 
(2009) argue that the benefit of leasing is that the repossession of leased assets is easier than 
foreclosure of secured loans. Lease financing has an advantage over straight debt and even 
secured debt in that it has a stronger financial claim, being effectively senior to any other 
financial claim. 
Some authors study the debt versus leasing decision. Ang and Peterson (1984) failed to 
demonstrate that debt and leasing are substitutes and found instead a complementary 
relationship. Although Lewis and Schallheim (1992) found similar results, Marston and Harris 
(1988), and Adedeji and Stapleton (1996) support substitutability. More recently, Mehran, 
Taggart and Yermack (1999) presented a mixed evidence and Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson 
(2000) argue that leasing and debt are partial substitutes.
6
 
3. Basic Characteristics of Structured Leasing Transactions 
Structured leasing is a specific and recent type of transaction, confirmed by the fact that 
references to it have only appeared recently. As pointed out by Caselli (2005) “… structured 
leasing was recognized as new transaction and an independent form of leasing within the 
structured finance and asset finance sector.” Additionally, banks and sponsors try to protect 
their expertise in the sector, believed to offer a competitive advantage. 
                                                 
4
 For accounting purposes, a lease can be classified as either an operating lease or a capital lease. 
According to FASB Statement No. 13 “[A] lease that transfers substantially all of the benefits and risks 
incident to ownership of property should be accounted for as the acquisition of an asset and the 
incurrence of an obligation by the lessee.” Thus, all other leases should be accounted for as operating 
leases. FAS 13 specifies that if one of the following four criteria are met for a noncancelable lease at the 
date of the lease agreement, the lease is to be accounted for as a capital lease: (i) the lease transfers 
ownership of the property to the lessee by the end of the lease term; (ii) the lease contains a bargain 
purchase option; (iii) the lease term is equal to 75% or more of the estimated economic life of the leased 
property; and (iv) the present value of the minimum lease payments (excluding executor costs) equals or 
exceeds 90% of the fair value of the leased property. 
5
 Krishnan and Moyer (1994) present a very concise and complete literature review on this subject. 
6
 See Braund (1989) for a review of the empirical studies on leasing. 
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It is a very versatile instrument that enables the lessee to position the deal in an optimal 
manner in relation to cash flow structure, its sustainability over time and the distribution of tax 
benefits. A key feature of structured leasing transactions, which differentiates them from other 
financing arrangements, is the presence of a separate vehicle company (SPV or SPE) 
incorporated to take the initiative and hold the leased asset(s) and to secure cash receipts and the 
resulting payments. 
As in other tax-based techniques, the implementation of a structured leasing transaction 
is more significant when the value of the asset is large and allows for a potentially greater tax 
benefits’ appropriation. Considering the nature and the role of the asset, which affects the 
financial flows and risk set-up for the transaction, we can identify diverse structured leasing 
transactions. Thus, bearing in mind the asset nature in terms of product category, real estate can 
be residential, administrative, commercial, industrial or infrastructural. In terms of the asset 
nature, from a legal point of view, it can already exist and be owned by the lessee, can already 
exist and be owned by a third party, or may even not yet be built. The next figure provides a 














Source: Adapted from Caselli (2005). 
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the nature and intensity of financial and equity risks associated with the transaction, the legal 




Plant & equipment 
Ships & aircraft 
 















by a third 
party 
Leasing or structured leasing or project leasing 
Pure sale and leaseback or structured leasing 
Leasing or mainly project finance To be built Leasing or mainly project finance 
 8 
the transaction itself.” Contrary to commercial, industrial, and infrastructural real estate, and 
above all industrial plant and equipment, residential, and to a degree, administrative real estate, 
ships and aircraft represent, ceteris paribus, a lower financial and equity risk because they tend 
to have a better defined market value – the secondary market for this assets is wider. This 
analysis in relation to legal profile and product-category profile can be extended, by considering 
size and whether the deal is of a domestic or of cross border nature.
7
 
Considering the existing literature, structured leasing transactions can fall within one of 
the two following categories: (i) leveraged leases (or tax or true leases); and (ii) synthetic leases 
(or synthetic structured leases). The increased tax benefits afforded by operating leasing have 
provided a strong stimulus to create ‘structured’ transactions that give operating leasing the 
same characteristics as true financial leasing. The so-called synthetic leasing transactions. 
A leveraged lease (a true lease) is similar to a single-investor lease (also called 
nonleveraged leases or direct leases) but more complex in size and in the number of involved 
parties – it involves a minimum of three parties with diverse interests: a lessee, a lessor, and a 
nonrecourse lender.
8
 In a leveraged lease (sometimes called a three-party transaction) the lessor 
becomes the owner of the leased equipment by providing a fraction of the capital necessary to 
purchase the equipment. The rest of the capital (70% to 80%) is borrowed from institutional 
investors on a nonrecourse basis to the lessor. As asserted by Fabozzi et al. (2006), in a 
leveraged lease the largest part of the “… debt is raised on the private placement market at little 
or no premium over what the lessee would expect to pay directly for such debt. The sources 
include insurance companies; pension plans; profit-sharing plans; commercial banks; finance 
companies; saving banks; domestic leasing companies; foreign banks; foreign leasing 
companies; foreign investors; and institutional investors.” 
The lease all-in cost varies with the credit standing of the lessee and with the risk of the 
transaction. A guarantor of the lessee obligations – a lessees’ parent or sister company, a third 
party, or a government agency – may be necessary if the credit of the lessee is insufficient to 
support the transaction. 
The ‘leverage’ in leveraged leases comes from the fact that: (i) the lessor provides only 
20% or 30% of the capital needed to purchase the equipment and stay at risk only for that 
portion; (ii) the lessor can claim all of the tax benefits related to ownership – a leveraged lease is 
always a true lease; and (iii) the lessor has the right to 100% of the residual value provided by 
the lease.
9
 It is this leverage that allows the lessor to offer the lessee a lower lease rate than the 
                                                 
7
 See Caselli (2005) for a further discussion of the structured leasing transaction market, with a focus on 
the European market. 
8
 See, e.g., Shank and Gough (1999), Amembal (2000), Boobyer (2003) and Deo (2009) for further 
discussion of the economics of leveraged leasing. 
9
 See Fabozzi et al. (2006) for a description of the various steps and milestones in structuring, negotiating 
and closing leveraged lease transactions. 
 9 
lessor could offer under a nonleveraged lease or direct lease – the equity investor passes a 
portion of his tax benefit back to the lessee in the form of reduced lease payments.
10
 Leveraged 
transactions tend to be used in markets offering specific tax advantages to leveraged leasing 
transactions. Caselli (2005) argue that “[T]his occurs mainly in two different situations: in 
international cross-border leasing, and when trusts are used.” 
Cross-border leasing refers to German (GELL - German Leveraged Leasing), French 
(FDDL - French Double Dip Leasing), US (USPL - US Pickle Leasing), and UK (BDDL – 
British Double Dip Leasing) markets where its use offers specific tax advantages to the lessor, 
making the transaction more attractive both for the foreign lessee and for potential financiers of 
the leveraged transaction, who can ‘participate in’ the increased tax benefits produced by the 
deal. Cross-border leases have become a source of financing for European Companies. The U.S. 
Cross-border lease (closed on a variety of assets) is structured to benefit from tax arbitrage 
between US and an European Lessee [see, e.g., Wanzenboeck (2001)]. When the leasing is 
structured based on the interposition of a trust between the lessor and lessees the tax benefits 




When a sponsor is facing low expected marginal tax rates, a leveraged leasing may 
provide the lowest after-tax cost of funding. Additionally, if a sponsor cannot efficiently use the 
maximum depreciation or interest deduction benefits associated with tax ownership of assets, an 
institutional equity investor who can efficiently use these benefits may be willing to give back a 
portion of these benefits to the sponsor in the form of lower lease payments. Thus, lessees who 
foresee that they may not be able to use the tax benefits of ownership (e.g., tax depreciation) 
generally tend to use leveraged leases. 
Having in mind that, in a leveraged lease, the lessee selects the assets, enjoys the 
benefits from their use – although it loses the tax benefits – and enjoys the lower lease rates. 
Exhibit 1 depicts the activities and cash flows involved. The main steps in the implementation 
of a leveraged leasing transaction are: Step 1 - the lessor establishes an SPV or a Trust, usually a 
bank, also known as the owner trustee or equity trustee; Step 2 - the lessor makes an equity 
investment (typically 20% or more of the purchase price) in the SPV; Step 3 - the lessee assigns 
the purchase agreement to the owner trustee; Step 4 - the trust borrows the remaining 80% or 
less from lenders;
12
 Step 5 - the lessor purchases the asset with 100% funding (a mix between 
                                                 
10
 In a large leverage lease – several owners and lenders are involved – an owner trustee is usually 
constituted to hold title to the equipment and represent the owners or equity participants. 
11
 See, e.g., Deo (2008) for an explanation of Cross-border Japanese Leveraged Leases. 
12
 As referred by Deo (2009), the borrowing process is “… accomplished as follows: the lenders select a 
trustee (usually a bank), also known as an indenture trustee or loan trustee; on behalf of the lender, the 
indenture trustee issues a loan to the owner trustee…” The loan has the following characteristics: (i) is 
secured by a mortgage of the asset; (ii) the income from the lease is assigned to the indenture trustee; and 
(iii) a guarantee of payment may be issued by the lessee. 
 10 
equity and debt) from the manufacturer; Step 6 - the lessor becomes the owner of the asset; Step 
7 - the lessee is being granted the permission to use the asset; and Step 8 - the lessee makes a 














Exhibit 1: Activities and cash flows involved in a Leveraged Lease. 
Source: The Authors. 
 
However, one of the drawbacks of a true sale of equipment for many lessees is the 
possible loss to be experienced when the true lease terminates and the equipment may have to 
be acquired from the lessor [Fabozzi et al. (2006)]. The synthetic lease was developed to solve 
this limitation, by providing at the same time off-balance sheet treatment of the lease obligation 
and protecting the lessee’s cost of acquiring the equipment when lease terminates. Weidner 
(2000) defines synthetic lease as a “… method used to provide off-balance sheet financing to a 
corporate entity for the acquisition and development of a commercial facility or site, with 
substantial credit support for debt issued by or through an investor or capital source, usually a 
financial institution.” A Synthetic lease transaction if typically structured using an SPV that is 
created solely for the purpose of a transaction or into a series of transactions. 
Synthetic leases are operating leases for accounting purposes and financing operations 
for tax purposes; i.e., they are off-balance sheet leases, in which the lessee remains the owner of 
the financed assets and retain the tax benefits associated with ownership, while simultaneously 































to the Lessor 
 11 
lease is structured on the basis of a lease agreement between the lessee (as the user or owner) 
and the lessor (as an investor), which complies with the requirements established by FAS 13 
and related accounting rules. For tax purposes, a synthetic lease is structured so that the lessee 
may reclaim that it is, in substance, the owner of encumbered property, with a rental obligation 
that should be treated as debt service. Additionally, the lessee claims a depreciable interest in 




As previously referred, a synthetic leasing transaction is based on the establishment of 
an SPV exclusively for the transaction. This means that the SPV is the owner of the asset / 
equipment, which then proceeds to organize the leasing with the lessee and to raise the funding, 
needed to purchase the asset itself. According to Caselli (2005), the motivations behind 
synthetic leasing are: “… a search for countries in which to domicile the SPV enabling greater 
tax benefits to be obtained than in the country of origin; the optimization of tax benefits by 
transforming financial leasing into operating leasing.”
14
 
In the first motivation, the SPV’s income statement will comprise: (i) depreciation of 
the asset; (ii) financial costs for servicing the debt; and (iii) installments received from leasing 
contracts. The lessee will select the most advantageous country from a tax treatment point of 
view, in which there is a significant difference between installments received by the SPV and 
the depreciation of the asset. Thus, the lessee can reduce the transaction all-in cost. 
In the second case, the use of an SPV is justified (apart from the reasons referred for the 
first case) to implement an operating leasing than a financial leasing and, consequently, 
increasing the tax benefits from the transaction. This is particularly relevant when the lessee 
wants to set up an off-balance sheet transaction to improve its structural margin. This idea is 
corroborated by Fowkes (2000), who states that “[S]ynthetic leasing may be the most cost-
effective option for lessees with high marginal tax rates.” 
Exhibit 2 depicts the activities involved in a synthetic lease structure. The core steps in 
the execution of a synthetic lease transaction are: Step 1 - the SPV is incorporated; Step 2 - the 
lessor, together with the lessee (typically a very small part of the SPV’s equity), makes an 
equity investment in the SPV; Step 3 - the SPV borrows the remaining from lenders;
15
 Step 4 - 
the SPV purchases the asset price from the supplier; Step 5 - the lessor becomes the owner of 
the asset; Step 6 - the SPV signs a leasing contract with the lessee giving the permission to use 
the asset; Step 7 - the lessee makes a series of payments, the lease payments; Step 8 - the SPV 
                                                 
13
 Especially in the early years of the financing arrangement, the combined depreciation and interest 
deductions typically exceed the rental deduction. 
14
 Altamuro (2006) asserts that the proponents of synthetic lease argue that economic benefits outweigh 
the costs of complexity and opacity, while critics argue that the economic benefits of these off-balance 
sheet transactions “… are the result of short-sighted opportunistic behavior by managers that lead to 
wealth extraction at the expense of other groups of stakeholders.” 
15
 The Lenders can fund the debt capital by a direct loan made through a pool or by issuing bonds. 
 12 
uses the periodic installments to repay the lenders; and Step 9 - the lessee exercises the call 
option on the asset or on the SPV shares. At the end of the transaction the lessee may, if it 
wishes, exercise the call option on the asset owned by the SPV or on shares in the SPV, so 













Exhibit 2: activities and cash flows involved in a Synthetic Lease. 
Source: The Authors. 
 
Fowkes (2000) summarizes the two types of structured leasing in a very concise way. 
He argues that with a leveraged lease, which is structured as a lease for tax purposes, the tax 
benefits of depreciation and interest deduction are retained by the lessor but partially passed 
back to the lessee through lower rents. A synthetic lease is an operating lease for accounting 
purposes but structured as a financing for tax purposes. Both use an SPE to act as an owner (or 
lessor) of the assets, and achieve off-balance sheet operating lease treatment for the lessee under 
FAS 13. 
4. The Economic Motivations for Using Structured Leasing 
The results of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and of subsequent authors
16
 that, under a 
specific set of restrictive and artificial assumptions – when markets are complete – the capital 
structure decision of firm was irrelevant to its market valuation, suggests that the design of 
securities and financing transactions in this case is also irrelevant. However, the result that 
capital structure effectively matters in a world where market frictions and imperfections are 
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present indicates that the design of securities and financing transactions may also be important. 
This throws light on the optimal design of securities and on the development of structured 
leasing transactions. Thus, research needs to focus on market imperfections to understand what 
are the economic motivations of structured leases. 
The literature on structured leasing suggests several possible economic motivations. The 
first relates to the fact that structured leasing enables the financing of a particular asset class 
when established forms of external finance are unavailable for a particular financing need. 
Beattie et al. (2000) argue that poor liquidity and cash flow have significant influence over 
leasing decisions.
17
 They conclude that structured leasing is usually used by firms using 
complex and large-scale assets and who face liquidity and cash flow constrains. The authors 
argue that “… the characteristics of a firm’s current and future assets, and in particular asset 
specificity, can influence financing.” The same line of reasoning is presented by Smith and 
Wakeman (1985), Williamson (1988), Krishnan and Moyer (1994), and Barclay and Smith 
(1995). According to Krishnan and Moyer (1994), “… firms with greater financial distress 
potential and high debt leverage, ceteris paribus, may find financing alternatives to leasing 
unavailable.” Thus, when bankruptcy probability increases, lease financing becomes a more 
attractive financing option as it offsets the higher transaction costs that are usually associated 
with lease agreements versus secured debt agreements. 
The second economic benefit is a reduction in funding costs, when the benefits of the 
reduced cost of funding are greater than the cost of the required credit enhancement. Comparing 
leasing with purchasing using borrowed funds, Fabozzi et al. (2006) present funding cost 
reduction via tax benefits as one of the major economic forces behind structured leasing. 
Structured leasing provides the option of ‘selling’ tax allowances to a lessor, in exchange for 
lower rental payments. In a tax-oriented transaction, the lease is treated as a true sale for tax 
purposes, so that tax benefits of ownership can be transferred to the lender. This is crucial in a 
true sale lease transaction, where a lessee cannot use tax benefits associated with equipment 
ownership due to the lack of currently taxable income or net carryforwards of operating loss.
18
 
According to Caselli (2005), “… the tax variable becomes a powerful tool for creating 
economic maneuvering room to reduce the cost of capital for its users.” Capturing tax benefits 
means taking advantage of the differences in tax treatment between leasing and other forms of 
                                                 
17
 Beattie et al. (2000) present the following four major determinants of leasing: (i) industry sector is a 
significant explanatory factor for the level of leasing; (ii) firm size has a different influence on the choice 
between leasing and other forms of debt finance – small companies may prefer leasing over debt; (iii) tax 
considerations is an important factor in the choice between debt and leasing; and (iv) poor liquidity and 
cash flow have significant influence over the decision of leasing. 
18
 Lease payments from leasing rather than borrowing are lower if a lease transaction is properly 
structured in a way that the lease will be treated as an operating lease for financial reporting purposes and 
as a true lease for tax purposes. A synthetic lease is a type of structured leasing transaction that meets this 
need while avoiding one of the drawbacks of a true lease for many lessees: the possibility of loss when 
the true sale lease terminates and the equipment may have to be acquired from the lessor. 
 14 
financing with the aim of reducing the lessee’s cost of capital – reduction of the all-in cost.
19
 
Additionally, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) argue that the benefit of leasing is that the 
repossession of leased assets is easier than the foreclosure of secured loans; i.e., lease financing 
has an advantage over straight debt and even secured debt, as far as it offers a stronger financial 
claim, being effectively senior to any other financial claim.
20
 Referring to the use of leasing in 
project financing, Fowkes (2000) argues that true leases may provide an alternative source of 
funding at a lower cost; i.e., in a leveraged lease (or tax or true lease) the lessee forgoes tax 
depreciation benefits but negotiates lower lease rates with the lessor. Altamuro (2006) shows 
that synthetic leases provide an economic benefit for the lessee in the form of lower direct 
financing costs. The author finds that synthetic lease firms receive more favorable interest rates 
on future syndicated loans.
21
 The minimization of bankruptcy risks for the bank or leasing 
company, compared to traditional real estate loan, is commonly presented as an effective benefit 
for lenders which is reflected in the borrower all-in cost. 
Structured leasing also allows the borrower to attain greater leverage, compared to 
senior unsecured debt, and to increase tax shields/savings. The modern theory of optimal capital 
structure starts with the Modigliani and Miller (1958) value-irrelevance propositions.
22
 
Although their propositions are difficult to test directly, financial innovation and structured 
finance in general, and particularly structured leasing, provide strong circumstantial evidence.
23
 
Furthermore, considering that structured leasing transactions have been one of the means by 
which firms form their capital structures, structured leases largely affect the value of the firm. 
This idea was initially presented in 1963, when Modigliani and Miller, using this logic, showed 
that, if corporate tax is in effect, firms should use debt exclusively as a financing instrument, 
since this would prevent corporate tax.
24
 Still, this prediction did not fit well with empirical 
evidence, which suggests that firms typically use moderate amounts of debt. As leverage 
                                                 
19
 As in other tax-based techniques, the implementation of a structured leasing transaction is more 
important when the value of the asset is large and allows for a potentially greater appropriation of tax 
benefits. 
20
 Some authors study the debt versus leasing decision. See, e.g., Ang and Peterson (1984), Marston and 
Harris (1988), Lewis and Schallheim (1992), and Adedeji and Stapleton (1996), Mehran et al. (1999), and 
Beatti et al. (2000). 
21
 Altamuro (2006) presents the following three major benefits to lessees using synthetic leases: (i) the 
ability to finance 100% of the purchase price of the asset; (ii) providing favorable financing taxes vis-a-
vis traditional debt financing; and (iii) generating financial reporting benefits – as the synthetic lease is an 
off-balance sheet transaction, neither the asset nor the related liabilities are reported in financial 
statements. 
22
 Harris and Raviv (1991) provide a relatively comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature related to capital structure. Myers (2001) and Barclay and Smith (2005) provide a more up-to-
date discussion of the principal theories and empirical findings. 
23
 Interesting studies on both theoretical and empirical literature in relation to structured finance include 
Caselli and Gatti (2005), Davis (2005), Fabozzi, Davis, and Choudhry (2006), Jobst (2007), Cherubini 
and Della Lunga (2007), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), and Criado and Rixtel (2008). 
24
 The value of a levered firm would equal the value of an unlevered firm plus the tax benefit associated 
with debt financing. 
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increases, there is an increase in the likelihood of financial distress and bankruptcy, and this 
should reduce the use of debt relative to equity financing [Myers (1984)].
25
 However, SPVs 
involved in structured leasing transactions have capital structures with higher leverage ratios 
than those of public companies; i.e., structured leasing transactions are characterized by their 
intensive use of debt. 
Several authors argue that tax considerations is an important factor in the choice 
between debt and leasing, because leasing provides the option of ‘selling’ tax allowances to a 
lessor, in exchange for lower rental payments [e.g., Lewellen et al. (1976), Myers et al. (1976), 
and Beattie et al. (2000)]. Regarding structured leases, Caselli (2005) and Fabozzi et al. (2006) 
present the capture of tax benefits (including cross border tax loopholes)
26
 as a major reason for 
sponsors choosing this type of financing transaction. As pointed out by Caselli (2005), “… the 
tax variable becomes a powerful tool for creating economic maneuvering room to reduce the 
cost of capital for its users.” Capturing tax benefits means taking advantage of the differences in 
taxation between leasing and other forms of financing, with the aim of reducing lessee’s cost of 
capital. Empirically, Slovin et al. (1990) study the impact on share prices of announcements of 
sale-and-leasebacks. They show that this type of transactions enhance lessee value but have no 
significant effects on lessors.
27
 Fowkes (2000) analyses the use of leasing in project financing 




The fourth economic motivation refers to maintaining the sponsors’ financial flexibility, 
by improving or maintaining financial ratios. Comparing leasing with purchasing using 
borrowed funds, Fabozzi et al. (2006) present the credit capacity preservation as a motivation 
for selecting structured leasing. According to reporting standards for leases, a capital lease – a 
lease that transfer substantially all of the benefits and risks incident to ownership of property, 
should be accounted for as the acquisition of an asset and the incurrence of an obligation by the 
                                                 
25
 The so-called trade-off theory of capital structure [Myers (1984)]. This theory has been criticized based 
on a set of arguments which resulted in the development of alternative theories [see Kim (1989) for a 
survey of this literature]. Other theories were based on asymmetric information [Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Myers (1977), and Green (1984)] and signaling [Ross (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), and 
Brennan and Kraus (1987)]. 
26
 Cross border leases are deals that are structured in a way that they take advantage of tax benefits in a 
country other than that in which the transactions takes place. This is achieved by using a vehicle company 
domiciled in other country, which assumes the role of lessee and them proceeds to rent the underlying 
asset to the effective lessee. 
27
 In a sale-and-leaseback transaction, a firm sells an asset it owns to another entity and at the same time 
leases it back from the new owner (the lessor). The lessor obtains the benefits from ownership, namely: 
depreciation allowances and tax credits. According to Slovin et al. (1990), the principal motive for such 
transactions is the “… potential for differences in applicable tax rates for lessees and lessors to create 
value enhancement.” 
28
 The author presents four motivations for combining leasing and project financing: (i) leasing may 
provide off-balance sheet treatment; (ii) leasing can provide improvement in earnings; (iii) leasing may 
allow a sponsor to maximize the tax benefits associated with ownership of the assets; and (iv) a true 
leasing may provide an alternative source of funding at a lower cost. 
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lessee (FASB Statement No. 13) – has to be capitalized as a liability and the equipment 
recorded as an asset on the balance sheet. Conversely, operating lease is not capitalized, and 
thus preserves credit capacity – the debt-to-equity ratio will be lower. Most long-term leases are 
structured to achieve the classification of operating leases for accounting purposes, and thus 
treated as off-balance sheet financing, which allows the lessee to preserve financial ratios. 
Focusing on synthetic leases, Weidner (2000) argues that these transactions improve 
balance sheet and ratios from which businesses are judged. When a lease is classified as an 
operating lease, the lessee does not depreciate the asset. This favorably impacts the price-to-
earnings ratio and the earnings-to-assets ratio. Similarly, Sandler (2000) presents the following 
benefits of off-balance sheet lease financing: (i) reduction in leverage ratio; (ii) increase in 
return on assets; (iii) increase in earnings and cash flows; (iv) increase in tax deductions for 
long-life assets; and (v) the ability to generate additional earnings from reinvestment of capital 
otherwise invested in leased assets. 
Additionally, structured leasing transactions allow sponsors to improve risk 
management. Caselli (2005) points out the risk transfer and risk management of the asset as one 
of the most important factors that stimulate the demand for this type of transactions. A 
structured lease (leverage lease or synthetic lease) is based on the establishment of an SPV 
exclusively for the transaction, which works as a key risk management device.
29
 In both 
structures – the SPV acts as an owner (leverage lease) or as a lessor (synthetic lease) of the 
assets – off-balance sheet operating lease treatment for the lessee under FAS 13 is achieved 
[Fowkes (2000)]. Contrary to a synthetic lease, in a leveraged lease all of the risks are 
substantially transferred to the lessor. For tax purposes, a synthetic lease is structured so that the 
lessee may reclaim that it is, in substance, the owner of the encumbered property. 
Finally, Fabozzi et al. (2006) present financial flexibility via working capital protection 
and fewer restrictions on management as important factors that stimulate the demand for 
structured leasing transactions. According to the authors, one of the advantages of leasing 
against borrowing to purchase equipment is that “… a lease agreement typically does not 
impose financial covenants and restrictions on management.” Regarding working capital 
protection, contrary to borrowing money to purchase equipment, leasing usually provides an 
amount equal to the entire price of the equipment. In addition, costs incurred to acquire the 
equipment (e.g., delivery and installation charges) can be included in a lease agreement. 
 
 
                                                 
29
 With a leveraged lease, which is structured as a lease for tax purposes, the tax benefits of depreciation 
and interest deduction are retained by the lessor but partially passed back to the lessee through lower 
rents. A synthetic lease is an operating lease for accounting purposes but structured as financing for tax 
purposes. 
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5. Problems Related to the Use of Structured Leases 
Although all of the above-mentioned economic advantages, structured leasing also has 
problems, especially when used inappropriately. Considering the available literature in the field 
of structured leasing, we have identified the following problems related to the use of structured 
leasing transactions: (i) complexity; (ii) off-balance sheet treatment; (iii) higher transaction 
costs; and (iv) Wealth Expropriation. 
According to Caselli and Gatti (2005) and Fabozzi et al. (2006), structured leasing 
transactions are fairly complex and involve a significant amount of cash flow evaluation, due 
diligence, negotiation, and legal procedures. It is commonly agreed that structured leasing 
instruments are complex vis-a-vis straight leasing transactions. The risk and return evaluation of 
a structured leasing transaction requires modeling the risk of the underlying asset(s) and cash 
flows, which can be particularly difficult if the asset pool is composed of heterogeneous assets. 
Additionally, it is necessary to evaluate the deal’s specific features, including how the cash 
flows will be distributed to the tranches or loans, the main covenants presented in the 
transaction, the rights and duties of various parties involved, and the elected credit enhancement 
mechanisms. Consequently, structuring such a deal is more costly than corporate financing. 
Another common problem relates to the fact that many structured leasing transactions 
are limited-recourse rather than nonrecourse, and thus there is a potential grey area in which 
accounting rules allow off-balance sheet treatment, but there is nonetheless some contingent 
liability to the sponsors. The off-balance sheet treatment is a key concept when we are referring 
to structured leasing. However, the terms nonrecourse and off-balance sheet should remain 
synonyms, which does not always happen. Only liabilities having effective no recourse to 
company´s shareholders can justly be treated as off-balance sheet. The ability to finance a 
corporation off-balance sheet by issuing structured securities starts, not with finance, but with 
legal procedures. As asserted by Rutledge and Raynes (2010), “… unlike the economics analysis 
underlying off-balance-sheet finance, which is internally consistent because it is mathematical, 
the legal theory of off-balance-sheet finance has yet to be formalized. The law is piecemeal, 
relatively unexamined and disconnected from the economics.” Fabozzi et al. (2006) issue a 
warning related to the use of structured lasing, namely the use of SPVs to manipulate 
accounting statements and commit fraud, and to reduce transparency and disclosure. Even in the 
absence of fraud, the transfer of assets to SPVs may mislead investors as to the extent of 
nonrecurring earnings or deferred losses. 
According to Caselli and Gatti (2005), the most commonly mentioned disadvantages of 
structured leases are the costs of opacity related to the identification of whose balance sheet 
(lessor or lessee) does some leased assets append? For example, synthetic leases are operating 
leases for accounting purposes and financing operations for tax purposes; i.e., they are off-
balance sheet leases, in which the lessee remains the owner of the financed assets and retains the 
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tax benefits associated with ownership, while simultaneously enjoying the benefits of an 
operating lease – the lessor offers the lessee a lower lease rate because the equity investor passes 
a portion of his tax benefit back to the lessee in the form of reduced lease payments. Another 
example is the leverage lease. For financial accounting purposes, a leverage lease (operating 
lease) is not disclosed in the lessee balance sheet as financial obligations; i.e., the lease 
equipment is not capitalized and the lease obligation is not shown as a liability on the balance 
sheet. 
Regarding transaction costs, Caselli and Gatti (2005) argue that one of the major 
disadvantages of structured leases are the costs of complexity. This idea is corroborated by 
Fabozzi et al. (2006), who state that a structured lease is similar to a single-investor lease – in 
terms of equipment selection and negotiation (rentals, options, responsibility for taxes, 
insurance, and maintenance) – but appreciably more complex in size, documentation, legal 
involvement, and, most importantly, in the number of parties involved and the unique 
advantages that each party gains. 
Miller and Upton (1976) conclude that no financial advantages accrue from leasing. 
Lewellen et al. (1976) and Myers et al. (1976) argue that, under a set of assumptions, there is a 
potential for gains in valuation for the firm involved in leasing, resulting from tax benefit 
expropriation (government bears a loss in taxes). According to Altamuro (2006), critics of 
structured leases argue that the economic benefits of these off-balance sheet transactions “… are 
the result of short-sighted opportunistic behavior by managers that lead to wealth extraction at 
the expense of other groups of stakeholders.” Finally, some authors [e.g., Wanzenboeck (2001)] 
argue that, in cross-border leasing, the wealth expropriation phenomenon is greater, essentially 
when the leasing is structured based on the interposition of a trust between the lessor and 
lessees. In this case, the tax benefits produced are duplicated. 
5. The Structured Leasing Market 
The review of factors underlying the growth of the leasing market highlighted the 
centrality of taxation. With structured leasing, lessees can use tax benefit in the most appropriate 
manner to achieve their economic and financial objectives. The regulatory framework is crucial 
when we are dealing with this type of transactions. Thus, understanding the tax framework in 
force in the country concerned allows the perception of economic maneuvering room of 
structured leasing. In Europe, the regulatory framework is quite well-defined and stable. 
There are three macro-trends helping to explain the structured leases’ market evolution: 
(i) tax regime – a significant change in tax framework (at home and overseas) strongly increases 
or decreases the size of the market; (ii) private banking and family office – the growth of the 
real estate leasing market is highly driven by these operators, who manage real estate 
investment portfolios; and (iii) international and synthetic-type transactions. 
 19 
The effective match between the leasing instrument and requirements of large real estate 
deals (in developing countries and others too) is a factor representing a substantial and structural 
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